The question of how to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s rule until 2030 has become a matter of increasing urgency in Zimbabwe. The complexities surrounding this issue are compounded by the presence of a faction within the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) that is pushing for Vice President Constantino Chiwenga to take over as the ZANU PF President during the party’s 2027 congress, with the ambition of becoming the presidential candidate in 2028. This internal division poses a significant challenge to Mnangagwa’s efforts to secure an extension of his leadership. While the legal framework in Zimbabwe, as set out in the 2013 Constitution, limits the presidency to two terms, there remain several legal, political, and strategic avenues that ZANU PF can pursue to extend Mnangagwa’s tenure until 2030, without breaching the Constitution.
First and foremost, the legal route for extending the president’s term lies in a constitutional amendment. According to Section 91 of the Zimbabwean Constitution, the presidency is limited to two five-year terms. However, Section 328 allows for the amendment of any provision of the Constitution, including the presidential term limit, provided the amendment is passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament and is approved through a national referendum. While this process is legally feasible, it presents a substantial political hurdle due to the factional dynamics within ZANU PF. The Chiwenga faction, which has powerful representation in Parliament, is likely to resist any amendment that would benefit Mnangagwa by extending his term. This creates a dilemma for Mnangagwa’s camp, which would need to secure a two-thirds majority in Parliament—a difficult feat given the internal divisions. A concerted effort must therefore be made to persuade the Chiwenga-aligned MPs that such an amendment serves the broader interests of ZANU PF’s long-term stability and continuity. The strategy would require navigating the party’s factions and ensuring that those who hold power within the party are aligned in favor of the amendment.
In the event that a constitutional amendment fails due to factional resistance, a second strategy could involve judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Mnangagwa’s legal team could argue that his first term, from 2018 to 2023, was conducted under a different electoral framework, and therefore his second term, starting in 2023, should be considered his first under the new electoral cycle. If this interpretation were to be accepted by the Constitutional Court, it could legally allow Mnangagwa to run for another term in 2028, sidestepping the need for a constitutional amendment. Historically, Zimbabwe’s judiciary has been favorable to ZANU PF in electoral matters, which increases the likelihood of success for this strategy. The legal argument could be framed around the notion that the political and electoral circumstances surrounding Mnangagwa’s first term were extraordinary, justifying a reinterpretation of his tenure.
Another avenue that could be explored, albeit more drastic, is the postponement of the 2028 elections. This could be justified on the grounds of national stability, security concerns, or the need for economic recovery. A State of Emergency could be declared, and Parliament would need to approve such a move. If the necessary legal framework is established, the government could push for judicial endorsement of the delay, arguing that political stability should take precedence over strict adherence to electoral timelines. However, this approach is fraught with risks. It could provoke significant international backlash, particularly from Western nations, and lead to economic and diplomatic sanctions. The international community has often viewed such moves as undemocratic, and this could damage Zimbabwe’s global standing. Additionally, this strategy may face opposition from within the country, including from civil society and opposition groups, which could mobilize to resist what they would perceive as an unconstitutional delay.
The political realignment within ZANU PF, particularly regarding succession, is another strategic avenue that could be employed. If the faction opposed to Mnangagwa’s extension proves too strong to overcome, he could seek to engineer a succession plan that ensures the continuation of his influence beyond 2028. The most likely candidate for this role is Frederick Musiiwa Makamure Shava, a trusted ally of Mnangagwa. Shava’s ascent to power would be carefully orchestrated to ensure that he would preserve Mnangagwa’s legacy and retain his political influence behind the scenes. This strategy would involve grooming Shava as the leader to succeed Mnangagwa, ensuring that the party remains firmly in the hands of Mnangagwa’s loyalists, and effectively maintaining control over the party apparatus. A scenario similar to what occurred in Singapore, where former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew continued to hold significant influence after his official retirement, could be replicated, with Mnangagwa playing a behind-the-scenes advisory role. This would allow the ZANU PF to maintain its control over Zimbabwe’s political landscape, even if a new figurehead takes the official reins.
The role of the opposition, particularly the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), in this political equation cannot be underestimated. The opposition will undoubtedly capitalize on any moves to extend Mnangagwa’s term as unconstitutional, using this as a rallying cry to delegitimize ZANU PF’s hold on power. To counter this, ZANU PF must ensure that it remains politically engaged with the opposition while controlling the narrative through state institutions. Electoral reforms, such as changes to voter registration laws or the control of campaign financing, may be deployed to tilt the playing field in favor of the ruling party. Additionally, the party would likely seek to neutralize any threat from the CCC by ensuring that key political players within the opposition are discredited or sidelined, while leveraging its control over the media and state apparatus to ensure a favorable political environment.
Finally, the international community’s reaction to any attempts to extend Mnangagwa’s rule must be carefully considered. The West, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, has historically opposed term extensions for African leaders, viewing such actions as antithetical to democratic principles. However, Zimbabwe’s strategic relationships with regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU), as well as international partners like China and Russia, could be leveraged to mitigate international criticism. Zimbabwe could frame any move to extend Mnangagwa’s term as necessary for national stability, a line that has been successfully employed by other African leaders in the past. The examples of Rwanda, Uganda, and Congo-Brazzaville, where leaders successfully extended their terms through constitutional amendments and referendums, offer a precedent that Zimbabwe can follow. In these cases, international support was garnered through diplomatic engagement and by emphasizing the perceived benefits of stability and continuity. Zimbabwe’s alliance with China and Russia, both of whom have supported term extensions in other countries, could prove to be crucial in balancing Western pressure.
In conclusion, while the legal and political challenges to extending President Mnangagwa’s rule until 2030 are significant, there remain several avenues that could be pursued. Constitutional amendments, judicial reinterpretation, strategic realignment, and international diplomacy provide a robust set of tools that ZANU PF can employ to secure Mnangagwa’s continued leadership. The factional dynamics within ZANU PF, however, represent the biggest hurdle to this process, with the Chiwenga faction likely to resist any amendment that favors Mnangagwa. By carefully navigating these internal dynamics, engaging with international partners, and maintaining control over the opposition, ZANU PF could achieve its goal of extending Mnangagwa’s presidency while ensuring the party’s continued dominance in Zimbabwean politics.
